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In the last decades, there has been a growing interest in historical research about 
the Ottoman Empire’s relationship to its tributary states. Many documents that 
were fundamental in canonising the legal positions of the individual polities, as 
well as the sultan’s expectations towards them, have been edited and analysed, 
and much of this research is available in English, French or German.1 On the 
other hand, the studies that present the diplomatic activities of the individual 
tributaries at the Sublime Porte and the attempts of these tributaries to try the 
limits of their dependence or resist the new demands of Ottoman dignitaries 
*  Research fellow, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Research Centre for the Humanities, 
Institute of History, karmangabor@gmail.com 
1 To name only the most comprehensive studies: Nicolaas H. Biegman, e Turco-Ragu-
san Relationship According to the Firmāns of Murād III (1575–1595) Extant in the State 
Archives of Dubrovnik, e Hague and Paris 1967; Mihai Maxim, L’Empire Ottoman au 
nord du Danube et l’autonomie des Principautés Roumaines au XVIe siècle: Études et do-
cuments, Istanbul 1999; idem, Romano-Ottomanica: Essays and Documents from the 
Turkish Archives, Istanbul 2001; Viorel Panaite, e Ottoman Law of War and Peace: 
e Ottoman Empire and Tribute Payers, New York 2000; Sándor Papp, Die  Verleihungs-, 
Bekrä%igungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen: Eine 
quellenkritische Untersuchung, Vienna 2003; idem, “Christian Vassals on the Northwest 
Border of the Ottoman Empire,” in e Turks, vol. 3, Ottomans, Hasan Celal Güzel – C. 
Cem Oguz – Osman Karatay (eds), Ankara 2002, 719–730. A comprehensive overview of 
the legal status, diplomatic practices and Ottoman military co-operation of early mod-
ern tributaries has been recently published: e European Tributary States of the Otto-
man Empire in the Sixteenth–Seventeenth Centuries, Gábor Kármán with Lovro Kunčević 
(eds), Leiden 2013.
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with means of diplomacy largely remained within the frames of Croatian, Hun-
garian and Romanian national historiographies. Ironically enough, due to the 
diﬀerences of the survival of sources concerning the various tributary states, 
the least is known about Moldavia and Wallachia, where the exact conditions 
were quite frequently changed, whereas the rich holdings of the Ragusan archi-
ves could oﬀer much material to this question–had the city state’s position not 
been relatively stable during the early modern period. e diplomatic activities 
of the Transylvanian princes at the Sublime Porte had traditionally not been a 
ﬁeld of primary interest for the researchers of the principality’s past: only in the 
last decade a proliferation of case studies concerning this topic could be seen.2 
e relatively rich surviving documentation on the negotiations around the 
succession of Prince György Rákóczi II (1648–1660) oﬀers an excellent oppor-
tunity for an in-depth study of Ottoman negotiation strategies as well as the 
potential of a tributary state to withstand the pressure coming from their side. 
e succession of György Rákóczi I’s older son as prince of Transylvania 
was supposed to be a simple matter. His father, the ruler of the principality since 
1630, made serious steps in the early 1640s to ascertain that he would be follo-
wed by György Junior by securing for him both necessary components of prin-
cely power: election by the Transylvanian diet and the consent of the sultan.3 
In 1642 the diet elected the new prince, and a$er long and elaborate negotiati-
ons and oﬀering a large amount of presents, the principality’s diplomats could 
convince the Sublime Porte to accept this decision. eir success was, however, 
2 Sándor Papp, “II. Rákóczi György és a Porta” [György Rákóczi II and the Porte], in 
 Szerencsének elegyes forgása: II. Rákóczi György és kora, Gábor Kármán with András Pé-
ter Szabó (eds), Budapest 2009, 99–170; idem, “Bethlen Gábor, a Magyar Királyság és a 
Porta” [Gábor Bethlen, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Porte], Századok 145 (2001), 
915–974; Balázs Sudár with János B. Szabó, “’Independens fejedelem az Portán kívül’: 
II. Rákóczi György oszmán kapcsolatai: Esettanulmány az Erdélyi Fejedelemség és az 
Oszmán Birodalom viszonyának kérdéséhez” [‘Independent Prince outside of the Porte’: 
e Ottoman Contacts of György Rákóczi II: A Case Study for the Question of the Re-
lationship between the Principality of Transylvania and the Ottoman Empire], Századok 
146 (2012), 1017–1048; 147 (2013), 931-999.
3 On the election of the princes see Graeme Murdock, “’Freely Elected in Fear’: Prince-
ly Elections and Political Power in Early Modern Transylvania,” Journal of Early Mod-
ern History 7, no. 3–4 (2003), 214–244; Zsolt Trócsányi, Az erdélyi fejedelemség korának 
országgyűlései (Adalék az erdélyi rendiség történetéhez) [Diets in the Age of the Princi-
pality of Transylvania: Contributions to the History of the Transylvanian System of Es-
tates], Budapest 1976.
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only partial. Contrary to the earlier example of Catherine of Brandenburg, the 
wife of Gábor Bethlen (1613–1629), whose election as his husband’s designa-
ted successor had been acknowledged in 1627 vivente principe by the sultan in 
a solemn document called ‘ahdname-i hümayun, Grand Vizier Kemankeş Kara 
Mustafa Pasha could this time only be convinced to issue a berat, a document of 
much lower esteem. It also added to Rákóczi’s concerns that his son only rece-
ived some insignia of the princely power from the Porte: although the sword, 
the banner and the mace duly arrived, the grand vizier did not send the horse 
which was expected to complete the set of symbolic tools generally used on 
occasion of the Transylvanian princes’ inaugurations.4 #us, when his father 
died in October 1648, György Rákóczi II could not be sure about the security 
of his rule until he received full acknowledgment from the Sublime Porte in the 
form of an ‘ahdname. #is proved to be rather complicated due to the conﬂicts 
with the Ottoman court that the young prince inherited from his father, con-
cerning money issues, speciﬁcally the sum of the tribute the prince was suppo-
sed to pay to the sultan.
#e yearly payment of the tribute was probably the most important element 
of the relationship between the Principality of Transylvania and the Ottoman 
Empire. During the sixteenth–seventeenth centuries there was an oscillation 
in the intensity of the principality’s Ottoman dependence and the degree of 
Istanbul’s inﬂuence on the princes’ foreign aﬀairs changed quite frequently. By 
paying the tribute, however, the princes acknowledged their fealty towards the 
sultan each year. #e suspension of payment unambiguously meant the prince’s 
attempt to release himself from his bond to the sultan, as it happened during 
the rule of Prince Zsigmond Báthori in the last decade of the late sixteenth 
century. It is thus no surprise that the sultan quite rarely renounced the tri-
bute payment voluntarily, even for a short period of time. Such cases are known 
4 On the negotiations at the Sublime Porte see Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, 99–121. On the 
insignia in general see János B. Szabó, “Insignia of the Transylvanian Princes” Majestas 4 
(1996), 85–105; János B. Szabó with Péter Erdősi, “Ceremonies Marking the Transfer of 
Power in the Principality of Transylvania in East European Context” Majestas 11 (2003), 
111–160; János B. Szabó, “#e Insignia of the Princes of Transylvania” in Turkish Flow-
ers: Studies in Ottoman Art in Hungary, Ibolya Gerelyes (ed), Budapest 2005, 131–142. 
On the documents issued about the acknowledgment of princely successors see Sándor 
Papp, “#e System of Autonomous Muslim and Christian Communities, Churches, and 
States in the Ottoman Empire” in Kármán – Kunčević (eds), "e European Tributary 
States, 375-419 at 409.
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from the second stage of the Long Turkish War at the turn of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries: three-years moratoria were granted to András Báthori 
in 1599, and Zsigmond Báthori in 1601, whereas in 1604 the ‘ahdname given to 
the “Hungarian lords who escaped to Turkey” promised that the sultan would 
not expect the payment of tribute in the next ten years.5 In all these cases the 
Sublime Porte made references to the great poverty of the principality due to 
the wars, but the main motivation behind the sultans’ lenience was quite obvio-
usly their aspiration to re-establish their inﬂuence upon the country. Only one 
case is known when a prince was able to achieve a moratorium of tribute pay-
ment with only diplomatic means: in 1617 Prince Gábor Bethlen was granted 
such a concession with respect to having delivered the castle of Lippa (today 
Lipova, Romania) to Ottoman hands in the previous year and supporting their 
Polish campaign.6
Gábor Bethlen was also the only prince who could successfully negotiate a 
reduction of the tribute from the Sublime Porte. e sum the prince was sup-
posed to pay was originally 10,000 gold coins, raised to 15,000 when the sul-
tan acknowledged István Báthori as prince of Transylvania in 1575. At the turn 
of June 1625 Bethlen managed to get an imperial letter (ferman) from Sultan 
5 An overview of Transylvania’s tribute payment until the end of György Rákóczi I’s rule: 
Cristina Feneşan, “Der Harac Siebenbürgens in der ersten Häl*e des 17. Jahrhunderts,” 
Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes 34/ 1–2 (1996), 97–106. See also János Lipták, A 
portai adó története az erdélyi fejedelemségben, Késmárk 1911. On the ‘ahdname grant-
ed to András Báthori, see Gábor Kármán, “Báthori András ahdnáméja” [!e ‘ahdname 
of András Báthori], Fons: Forráskutatás és Segédtudományok 14 (2007), 339–348. !e 
‘ahdname of Sultan Mehmed III to Zsigmond Báthori (11 August 1601) as well as that 
of Ahmed I to the “Hungarian lords who escaped to Turkey” (between 30 March and 
28 April 1604) were published by Sándor Papp, Die Verleihungs-, Bekrä'igungs- und 
Vertragsurkunden, 252–254, resp. 258–259 (Nos. 51 and 52). !e text of the appointment 
charter for Mózes Székely in 1602 has not been preserved, but it also granted a mora-
torium for tribute payment, see ibid. 116; Sándor Papp, “Székely Mózes erdélyi fejede-
lem hatalomra kerülésének diplomáciai tanulságai és egy nagyvezíri előterjesztés (telhis) 
keletkezése” [Diplomatic Conclusions Concerning Mózes Székely’s Assumption of the 
Rule over Transylvania and the Formation of a Telhis by the Grand Vizier], Aetas 14/4 
(1999), 71–85, here 79.
6 Feneşan, “Der Harac” 103. On Bethlen’s (actually quite meagre) contribution to Iskend-
er Pasha’s Polish campaign see recently Balázs Sudár, “Iskender and Gábor Bethlen: !e 
Pasha and the Prince” in Europe and the Ottoman World: Exchanges and Conﬂicts (Six-
teenth–Seventeenth Centuries), Gábor Kármán with Radu G. Păun (eds), Istanbul 2013, 
141-169 at 158-162.
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Murad IV in which the padishah reset the tribute of the land to the original 
10,000 gold coins.7 Bethlen’s successor, György Rákóczi I continued to pay 
this sum and for him the most important task was not to achieve a further 
reduction, but rather to convince the Ottoman elite not to demand a raise again.
It seems the Sublime Porte announced that they would again expect a tribute 
of 15,000 gold coins from Transylvania during the negotiations concerning the 
acknowledgment of György Rákóczi Junior’s succession.8 As an immediate 
response, György Rákóczi I brought up the argument to be o$en used in the 
following years, that according to the formulation of the “very beautiful letter” 
given to Gábor Bethlen (which in all likelihood referred to the ferman of 1625) 
the concession concerning the tribute was not given to a speciﬁc prince, but to 
the country. erefore, Rákóczi argued, the Ottoman dignitaries had no reason 
to expect the higher sum again a$er Bethlen’s death.9 For a while, this argu-
ment seems to have worked: in the next year there is no mention of raising the 
tribute, and the only problem was caused by the fact that the prince sent the 
sum in silver talers, so his diplomats had to arrange that the Jewish merchants 
in Istanbul exchanged it for gold coins.10
In a short time, however, the Porte had the chance to use the prince’s request 
for a favour in order to start a new discussion of the tribute’s scale, since György 
Rákóczi I had to ask for the sultan’s consent to start his anti-Habsburg war-
fare in alliance with the crowns of Sweden and France in the last phase of the 
7 e document, in contemporary Hungarian translation is published in Áron Szilády with 
Sándor Szilágyi (eds), Török-magyarkori állam-okmánytár [State Documents from the 
Turkish-Hungarian Age], vol. 1, Pest 1868, 427–430. See also Feneşan, op.cit., 103–104.
8 István Rácz’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 2 June 1642) Sándor Szilágyi (ed), Le-
velek és okiratok I. Rákóczy György keleti összeköttetései történetéhez [Letters and Docu-
ments Concerning the History of György Rákóczi I’s Eastern Contacts], Budapest 1883, 
674.
9 György Rákóczi I’s letter to István Rácz (Alvinc, 8 July 1642) Sándor Beke with Samu 
Barabás (eds), I. Rákóczy György és a Porta: Levelek és iratok [György Rákóczi I and the 
Porte: Letters and Documents], Budapest 1888, 594. In 1647, Rákóczi even sent a copy 
of the imperial letter to the Porte in order to prove his point, see his letter to István Sza-
lánczi (Várad, 24 January 1647) Szilágyi (ed), op.cit., 821.
10 Mihály Maurer’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 11 December 1643) Beke with Ba-
rabás (eds), op.cit., 643. e payment was generally expected in gold coins, and it was on-
ly possible in extraordinary situations to pay in silver talers, see Feneşan, op.cit., 104–105.
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irty Years War.11 Grand Vizier Semin Mehmed Pasha complained to Chief 
Ambassador István Serédy, who had accompanied the principality’s tribute for 
the year 1644 to Istanbul, that although the prince’s wishes had been fulﬁlled 
and consent had been given to Rákóczi’s campaign, the Porte did not receive 
even the regular tribute in return (under which the grand vizier meant the sum 
of 15,000 gold coins), in spite of his repeated reminders about the Transylva-
nian ruler’s duties.12 What is more, the Sublime Porte added another ﬁnancial 
demand to the earlier ones in 1644. In the early phase of his campaign, György 
Rákóczi I managed to conquer thirteen Hungarian counties, and thus he could 
reasonably hope to be able to conclude a peace similar to that of his predeces-
sor, Gábor Bethlen, who secured his control over a signiﬁcant part of Eastern 
Hungary in repeated peace treaties in the 1620s. Following the example set 
by Bethlen, Rákóczi also requested an ‘ahdname for his rule over the coun-
ties in order to secure Ottoman support for his plans.13 In exchange for issuing 
the document according to the blueprint he had submitted, the prince oﬀe-
red to send a present of 20,000 talers (10,000 gold coins). However, the new 
grand vizier, Sultanzade Mehmed Pasha thought that there was more money to 
11 Katalin Péter, “e Golden Age of the Principality” in e History of Transylvania, vol. 2, 
From 1606 to 1830, László Makkai with Zoltán Szász (eds), Boulder 2002, 100–130. See 
also Ioan Hudiţă, Histoire de relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie au 
XVIIe siècle (1635–1683), Paris 1927, 34–82; Kálmán Benda, “Les relations diplomatiques 
entre la France et la Transylvanie” in Les relations franco-autrichiennes sous Louis XIV: 
Siège de Vienne (1683): Colloque à propos du Tricentenaire du siege de Vienne 9–11 Mars 
1983, Jean Bérenger (ed), Saint Cyr 1983; Jean Nouzille, “Les relations entre la France et 
Transylvanie pendant la guerre de trente ans: La diﬃcile recherche d’une alliance de re-
vers” Revue Roumaine d’Histoire 36 (1997), 176–182. On the prince’s diplomatic activities 
in order to achieve the Porte’s consent for his campaign see Papp, “II. Rákóczi György”, 
122–124.
12 István Serédy’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 1 January 1645) Szilágyi (ed),  Levelek, 
827–828. In general, two types of diplomats were serving at the diplomatic representa-
tion of Transylvania at the Sublime Porte. e tribute was delivered to the sultan by the 
so-called chief ambassadors (főkövet), who le/ the Ottoman capital a/er their mission 
was completed; whereas the everyday tasks of diplomatic representation fell upon the 
orators (kapitiha), who replaced each other on a yearly basis. For more details, see my 
“Sovereignty and Representation: Tributary States in the Seventeenth-Century Diplo-
matic System of the Ottoman Empire” in Kármán – Kunčević (eds), e European Tribu-
tary States, 155-185 at 159-161.
13 On the ‘ahdname given to Bethlen concerning his rule over the seven Eastern Hungarian 
counties, see Papp, op.cit., 129–130.
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extract from this deal: he announced that the ‘ahdname would only be issued 
once the money arrived and he also noted that the document should include 
the passage that Rákóczi should pay this sum of money on a yearly basis due 
to the enlarged territory under his rule.14 #e chief ambassador of the prince, 
István Serédy paid the 20,000 talers to the sultan in May 1645, but the diverging 
interpretations concerning the nature of this sum lingered on, together with the 
debate about the scale of the tribute.15
#e situation only got worse in the following years. György Rákóczi I was 
not willing to pay more than 10,000 gold coins as a tribute in the year 1646 
either. #is time he added to his reasoning the argument that it was not in his 
power to send a higher sum, as the tribute to the Porte was voted each year by 
the Transylvanian diet, over whose decisions he had no control whatsoever.16 
#is statement, however, failed to achieve the desired results. István Szalánczi, 
the chief ambassador of the principality, who had been sent to the Porte with 
the tribute in the beginning of 1645 and was forced to stay in the Ottoman capi-
tal, noted that the Ottoman dignitaries continued to blame Rákóczi exclusively, 
instead of his estates.17 Considering the weakness of the Transylvanian esta-
tes in any of their conﬂicts with the actual prince, the statement that György 
14 See Serédy’s letter quoted in footnote 12, as well as the report of Mihály Maurer and 
György Hajdu to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 2 November 1644) Beke with Barabás 
(eds), I. Rákóczy György, 721–722. On more details concerning the ‘ahdname requested 
for the Hungarian counties see Papp, op.cit., 124–130.
15 István Serédy’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 3 May 1645) Szilágyi (ed), op.cit., 
838. See for instance Grand Vizier Nevesinli Salih Pasha’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Is-
tanbul, last decade of Cemaziyelahir 1056 / 5–14 July 1646), in which he acknowledg-
es the payment of 1645, but reminds the prince that he failed to pay for the Hungarian 
counties in 1646, József Blaskovics, “Az ‘orta Madzsar’ (Orta Macar) és Erdély történetére 
vonatkozó török okiratok I. Rákóczi György fejedelem korából” [Turkish Documents 
Concerning the History of Orta Macar and Transylvania from the Period of György 
Rákóczi I’s Rule], Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Levéltári Évkönyve 6 (1990), 285–287.
16 György Rákóczi I’s letter to his envoy at the Sublime Porte (Gyulafehérvár, 31 March 
1646) Beke with Barabás (eds), op.cit., 789. See also the prince’s letter to István Szalánczi 
(Szatmár, 19 June 1646) István Török, “Adatok I. Rákóczy György fejedelem uralkodása 
történetéhez” [Data Concerning the History of György Rákóczi I’s Rule], Történelmi Tár 
27 (1904), 596–606, here 604.
17 István Szalánczi’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 29 March 1647) Beke with Barabás 
(eds), I. Rákóczy György, 833–834; Alexander Greiﬀenklau’s letter to Emperor Ferdi-
nand III (Pera, 4 May 1647) Österreichisches Staatsarchiv Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv 
(henceforth HHStA) Staatenabteliungen Türkei I. Kt. 120. Fasc. 60. Konv. C 1647 fol. 38.
601 
 THE PRICE OF SUCCESSION
Rákóczi I could not have forced them to pay even if he wanted them to do 
so sounds like a quite cynical attempt to shi responsibility. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the principality’s diet did not want to give in easily to the Ottoman 
demands either: we know their letters to the prince, as well as to Szalánczi, in 
which they requested persistence in this question.18
e Sublime Porte, in turn, used more and more pressure to achieve its desi-
red goals. None of the four grand viziers who replaced each other in the oﬃce 
up to 1648 granted permission for Szalánczi to leave Istanbul, and an increasing 
amount of comments were made about the possibility of replacing the Transy-
lvanian prince with Mózes Székely Jr., a pretender kept in custody in the Otto-
man capital. Grand Vizier Hezarpare Ahmed Pasha also made it clear that he 
was unwilling to make any steps to stop the raids of the Ottoman border gar-
risons in Transylvanian territory as long as the question of the tribute was not 
settled.19 !e gravity of the situation can amply be illustrated with the panic 
of Szalánczi, who had been involved in the principality’s negotiations with the 
Sublime Porte since the 1630s, and could thus by no means seen as a person 
who could easily be scared. !is seasoned diplomat begged his prince in seve-
ral letters that “it would be better to give this sum and thus achieve security 
for our homeland than to lose the homeland just for this petty money.”20 !e 
prince did not give in and Szalánczi became the personal victim of this diplo-
18 !e Transylvanian estates’ memorandum (Gyulafehérvár, 9 April 1647) Sándor Szilágyi 
(ed), Erdélyi országgyűlési emlékek történeti bevezetésekkel [Documents of the Diets of 
Transylvania, with a Historical Introduction], vol. 10, 1637–1649, Budapest 1884, 461–
463; as well as their letter to István Szalánczi (Gyalu, 14 October 1647) Áron Szilády with 
Sándor Szilágyi (eds), Török-magyarkori állam-okmánytár [State Documents from the 
Turkish-Hungarian Age], vol. 3, Pest 1870, 403–405.
19 István Szalánczi’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 24 November 1647) Szilágyi (ed), 
Levelek, 887–888. Mózes Székely has been kept in a sort of house arrest in the fortress 
of the Seven Towers since 1633 and used several times as an instrument of pressure 
against Prince György Rákóczi I, see Ildikó Horn, “I&abb Székely Mózes (1603–1658?)”, 
in Auxilium historiae: Tanulmányok a hetvenesztendős Bertényi Iván tiszteletére, Tamás 
Körmendi with Gábor !oroczkay (eds), Budapest 2009, 143–148.
20 István Szalánczi’s letter to György Rákóczi I (Istanbul, 2 March 1647) Szilágyi (ed), 
op.cit., 878.
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matic tug-of-war, as he could never return to Transylvania: he died in Istanbul 
in January 1648, three years aer his arrival in the Ottoman capital.21
!is was the situation György Rákóczi II inherited from his father. Ferenc 
Gyárfás, his resident envoy at the Sublime Porte suggested to the young prince 
that he should listen to the advice of Zülﬁkar ağa, the dragoman in the service 
of the Transylvanian embassy and not even try to pay 10,000 gold coins as tri-
bute, but rather send the requested 15,000 right away.22 Rákóczi did not follow 
this counsel and sent a new chief ambassador, István Serédy on his way with the 
smaller sum. In order to support the argumentation presented by the prince’s 
diplomat for preventing the raise of the tribute, the Transylvanian diet that was 
in session in the beginning of 1649 also sent envoys as representatives of the 
country’s three privileged nationes.23
Serédy’s task was by no means easy: when he arrived at the Sublime Porte 
in March 1649 he had to face the fact that Grand Vizier Sofu Mehmed Pasha 
denied to grant him an audience and refused to accept any of the presents sent 
to him. !e chief ambassador placed high hopes in the expected change of the 
grand vizier’s person a month later, and indeed, the appointment of Kara Dev 
21 For more about his person see Klára Jakó, “A Szaláncziak (Egy fejezet az erdélyi fejedelem-
ség keleti diplomáciájának történetéből)” [!e Szalánczis: A Chapter from the History 
of the Eastern Diplomacy of the Principality of Transylvania], in Emlékkönyv Imreh Ist-
ván születésének nyolcvanadik évfordulójára, András Kiss-Gyöngy Kovács Kiss-Ferenc 
 Pozsony (eds), Kolozsvár 1999, 199–210. !e grand vizier refused to grant permission for 
the Transylvanians to make his burial ceremony a public event by inviting the staﬀ of oth-
er embassies; see the letter of Alexander Greiﬀenklau to Emperor Ferdinand III (Pera, 27 
February 1648) HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 120. Fasc. 60. Konv. D 1648 fol. 36v.
22 Ferenc Gyárfás’ letter to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 14 November 1648) Beke with 
Barabás (ed), I. Rákóczy György, 904. Grand Vizier Sofu Mehmed Pasha also ordered the 
payment of the “arrears” immediately aer having received the news of György Rákóczi 
I’s death; see the letter of Panaiotis Nicousios to Emperor Ferdinand III (13 November 
1648) HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 120. Fasc. 60. Konv. D 1648 fol. 228r.
23 Letter of the three Transylvanian nations to an unknown dignitary at the Porte (Gyulafe-
hérvár, 18 February 1649) Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára (State Archives 
of the Hungarian National Archives, henceforth MNL OL) Magyar Kamara Archívuma 
E 144 Történelmi emlékek 2. dob.
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Murad Pasha made the start of the negotiations possible.24 However, the deci-
sive moment of putting an end to the conﬂict was rather that György Rákóczi 
II gave in and sent the higher sum as tribute to the Porte. What is more, he also 
agreed to pay an aggregated 30,000 gold coins as the arrears for the last two 
years (when the grand viziers refused to accept the payments of 10,000 gold 
coins).25
György Rákóczi II had good reasons to relinquish his initial reluctance and 
break with his father’s policy of trying to convince the Sublime Porte with legal 
arguments about the injustice of their demands. $e Ottoman threats of for-
cing Mózes Székely upon the country, expressed not only by the grand vizier 
also by the beylerbey of Buda during his negotiations with Transylvanian dip-
lomats, were bad enough already, especially as Sofu Mehmed Pasha also used 
the Tatar menace in his talks with Serédy.26 $ese intimidations were not new, 
since his father also had to face them; however, György Rákóczi II was in an 
altogether diﬀerent position, as his rule over Transylvania could not be seen as 
secure until he received the sultan’s acknowledgment in the form of the ‘ahd-
name and the full set of insignia that he was refused back in 1642. 
By maintaining the “ex lex” situation, the prince did not only risk his country’s 
relationship towards the Sublime Porte, but also caused a breach in his control 
over the Transylvanian estates. In the diet that was in sitting between Janu-
ary and March 1649, the estates managed to secure unusually broad concessi-
24 István Serédy’s letters to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 12 April, respectively 12 May 1649): 
Sándor Szilágyi (ed), Erdély és az északkeleti háború: Levelek és okiratok /Transsylvania et 
bellum boreo-orientale: Acta et documenta, vol. 1, Budapest 1890, 74–75; respectively Sán-
dor Szilágyi, “Levelek és okiratok II. Rákóczy György fejedelem diplomacziai összekötte-
tései történetéhez” [Letters and documents concerning the diplomatic contacts of Prince 
György Rákóczi II], Történelmi Tár 12 (1889), 326–353, 451–490, 637–677, here 330.
25 Simon Reniger’s report to Emperor Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 12 May 1649) HHStA Tür-
kei I. Kt. 121. Fasc. 61. Konv. A fol. 98r. $e grand vizier’s letter, in which he acknowl-
edged the payment of two years’ tribute, was published by Jan Rypka, “Die türkischen 
Schutzbriefe für Georg II Rákóczi, Fürsten von Siebenbürgen, aus dem Jahre 1649” Der 
Islam 18 (1929), 213–235, here 217–219.
26 György Lippay’s letter to György Rákóczi II (Pozsony, 5 January 1649) Edit Izsépy (ed), II. 
Rákóczi György levelezéséből 1646–1660 [From the Correspondence of György Rákóczi 
II], Budapest 1992, 19; István Serédy’s letter to the prince (Istanbul, 2 May 1649) Sándor 
Szilágyi (ed), Okmánytár II. Rákóczy György diplomáciai összeköttetéseihez [A Collection 
of Documents Concerning the Diplomatic Contacts of György Rákóczi II], Monumenta 
Hungariae Historica. Ser. I. Diplomataria, nr. 23, Budapest 1874, 17. 
604 
GÁBOR KÁRMÁN
ons from the prince: the rights of the central princely treasury were curtailed 
and several legal processes against important noblemen were suspended. Zsolt 
Trócsányi, the renowned historian of the Transylvanian diets even suggested 
that this was one of the largest crises of central power during the principality’s 
existence.27 !e estates must have gained all these advantages through using 
their excellent bargaining position: if the prince wanted them to send an oﬃcial 
embassy to the Sublime Porte in order to solve the tribute question, he had to 
make concessions in various other ﬁelds. !is must have also been the reason 
why the arrears were not paid from the estates’ pockets, which would have been 
the normal procedure, but rather from the prince’s family treasury.28 With the 
sultan granting the ‘ahdname to György Rákóczi II, the scope of the estates’ 
action shrank again: in 1650 the list of the princely estates was codiﬁed, among 
them several that had earlier been conﬁscated by György Rákóczi I.
!e promise to pay the two years’ arrears did grant the young prince what 
he wanted: in June 1649 an ‘ahdname from Sultan Mehmed IV was drawn up 
for him and the kapıcı başı brought the document to Gyulafehérvár (today Alba 
Iulia, Romania) with a solemn legation.29 When János Kemény, the leading 
27 Trócsányi, Az erdélyi fejedelemség korának országgyűlései, 198–199. e biographers of 
György Rákóczi II also called attention upon this unusual amount of concessions see 
Sándor Szilágyi, II. Rákóczy György 1621–1660, Budapest 1891, 50–51; János Kósa, II. 
Rákóczi György, Budapest 1942, 48–49.
28 is was however also not an easy task: György Rákóczi II had a hard time convinc-
ing his mother, Zsuzsanna Lorántﬀy, who had control over the family treasury about 
the payment’s necessity. See the prince’s letter to his brother, Zsigmond (Pese[?], 30 Au-
gust 1649) MNL OL Magyar Kamara Archívuma E 190 Archivum Familiae Rákóczi de 
Felsővadász 43. d. 5. t. 681. sz. For more details see Gábor Kármán, Erdélyi külpolitika a 
vesztfáliai béke után [Transylvanian Foreign Policy a$er the Peace of Westphalia], Bu-
dapest 2011, 145. György Rákóczi II continued to pay this higher sum as a tribute until 
his ﬁrst deposition in 1658, see, for instance, his letter to Constantin Şerban, voievod of 
Wallachia (Gyulafehérvár, 17 March 1656) Szilágyi (ed), Okmánytár, 333.
29 e ‘adhname, dated from the ﬁrst decade of Cemaziyelahir 1059 (between 13 and 22 
June 1649) was published by Franz Babinger, “Zwei türkische Schutzbriefe für Georg II 
Rákóczi, Fürsten von Siebenbürgen, aus den Jahre 1649” Le Monde Orientale 14 (1920), 
115–151, here 140–149. See also Dan Prodan, “Mid-17th Century Transylvania and 
Franz Babinger: On a Berāt and an ‘Ahdnāme Handed to Prince Gheorghe Rákóczi II 
in 1649” Transylvanian Review 3, no. 2 (1994), 127–134. e reception of the kapıcı başı 
was planned for 20/21 July, but eventually had to be postponed to the 26th, see György 
Rákóczi II’ invitations to the Transylvanian aristocrats János Rhédey and Ferenc Bethlen 
(Gyulafehérvár, 7 July 1649) MNL OL Családi levéltárak P 1868 Rhédey család levéltára 
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personality in the princely council heard about the new, lenient attitude of the 
Sublime Porte, he expressed his hopes that the payment of the higher tribute 
may motivate the Ottomans to drop their claims for the money related to the 
Eastern Hungarian counties.30 He was bound to be disappointed: the Porte did 
not give in and urged the prince to send 60,000 talers, a three-year aggregate 
of the expected payment for the counties. During the negotiations the Transy-
lvanian diplomats emphasised that their lord should not be expected to pay for 
territories that he had never ruled over: according to the Peace of Linz (1645), 
the counties were bound to be returned to the Kingdom of Hungary a!er the 
death of György Rákóczi I, and the handover did in fact take place in the ﬁrst 
half of 1649.31 Nonetheless, they had to acknowledge that two counties, Sza-
bolcs and Szatmár remained under the Rákóczis’ rule, and the Sublime Porte 
kept on demanding a tribute a!er them.32
%e determination of the Ottoman state administration can also be illustra-
ted by the fact that a çavuş was sent to Gyulafehérvár to remind György Rákóczi 
II of his alleged duties. Ottoman diplomacy usually adhered to the method of 
sending envoys only in extraordinary situations.33 When the çavuş returned 
to Istanbul during the spring 1650, he could only deliver further excuses. %e 
prince called the attention of the Sublime Porte upon the fact that although the 
counties in question had indeed been part of his father’s inheritance, they were 
not under his jurisdiction, but were ruled by his younger brother and mother 
(who did in fact stay in Hungary during this period). %us, he claimed, it would 
be unjust to expect him to pay for them. On the other hand, György Rákóczi II 
tried to maintain further the argument of his father: the princes of Transylvania 
14. cs. 75. t; resp. Arhivele Naţionale Direcţia Judeţeană Cluj [National Archives, Province 
Directorate Cluj] Fond familial Bethlen din Criş Nr. 15. fol. 250; also the prince’s resolutio 
to János Tőrös (Gyulafehérvár, 25 July 1649) MNL OL E 190 Nr. 5392.
30 János Kemény’s letter to György Rákóczi II (Gerend, 18 May 1649) MNL OL E 190 Nr. 
5378.
31 Kármán, Erdélyi külpolitika, 148–150.
32 Simon Reniger’s letter to Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 15 February 1650) HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 
122. Fasc. 61/b. Konv. A fol. 73r.
33 On sending the çavuş see ibid. On the peculiar character of the early modern Ottoman 
diplomacy, see Bülent Arı, “Early Ottoman Diplomacy: Ad Hoc Period;” and G.R. Ber-
ridge, “Diplomatic Integration with Europe before Selim III” both in Ottoman Diploma-
cy: Conventional or Unconventional?, A. Nuri Yurdusev (ed), Houndmills 2004, 36–65, 
resp. 114–130.
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had never promised that they would pay a yearly tribute to the sultan for these 
territories.34 !e conﬂict was eventually solved with a compromise: the grand 
vizier consented to receive money for the counties only as a single instalment 
and not as a yearly tribute; moreover, the sum to be paid was set (with the active 
mediation of Zülﬁkar ağa) in 20,000 talers.35 For this amount, the Transylva-
nian prince could buy the benevolence of the Ottoman state administration. 
!e issue of a tribute for the Eastern Hungarian counties was never raised again 
a$er the summer of 1650, and when György Rákóczi II fell seriously ill in 1652 
and the Transylvanian diet elected his son Ferenc as a prince, the conﬁrmation 
of this act was rather easily obtained from the Sublime Porte.36
Altogether, as we have seen, the procedures of the diplomatic negotiations 
clearly mirrored the unequal positions of the two partners. Asking for special 
favours, that is, the acknowledgment of György Junior’s succession by the sul-
tan, the prince of Transylvania became indebted to the Ottoman dignitaries. 
!e Ottomans clearly regarded the payment of the higher tribute as a coun-
ter-service from György Rákóczi I, but as far as our current knowledge goes, 
this was never made explicit. !e Ottoman oﬃceholders, according to the testi-
mony of the Transylvanian diplomats’ reports, as well as their surviving letters 
to the prince, never connected the payment of 15,000 gold coins to the acknow-
ledgment of the succession or the sultan’s consent to the prince’s anti-Habs-
burg war: they simply started to refer to this as the regular sum of the tribute 
György Rákóczi I was supposed to pay to the Sublime Porte. !e ferman gran-
ted to Gábor Bethlen about the reduction of the tribute, which played a key role 
in the Transylvanian argumentation, seems to have received no attention from 
the Ottoman part: they did not openly question its authenticity, rather disregar-
ded it altogether. !is attitude was then completed with the demands concer-
ning György Rákóczi I’s rule over the seven Hungarian countries – in spite of 
34 Simon Reniger’s letter to Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 3 April 1650) HHStA Türkei I. Kt. 122. 
Fasc. 61/b. Konv. A fol. 142r–v. Compared to the panicky atmosphere of 1647, the nego-
tiations remained remarkably calm this time: the few survived reports of the Transylva-
nian orators do not mention this issue at all, see Szilágyi (ed), Erdély, vol. 1, 139–153.
35 Simon Reniger’s letters to Ferdinand III (Istanbul, 22 August and 26 October 1650) HH-
StA Türkei I. Kt. 122. Fasc. 61/b. Konv. B fol. 129r, resp. 259v. On the Porte’s consent to the 
single-instalment payment see István Serédy’s letter to György Rákóczi II (Istanbul, 12 
May 1649) Szilágyi, “Levelek és okiratok” 329.
36 On the election and conﬁrmation of Ferenc Rákóczi I as a prince of Transylvania see 
Papp, “II. Rákóczi György” 138–144. 
607 
 THE PRICE OF SUCCESSION
the fact that, as far as we can see from the sources, the prince never received an 
‘ahdname for these territories. 
Such arbitrary conduct is also known from the history of other tributary 
states. In the critical situation a!er the Great Earthquake in Ragusa, which rui-
ned the major part of the city in 1667, Kaymakam Kara Mustafa Pasha used 
the opportunity to try and extort an enormous sum of 150,000 ducats from 
the Republic citing the complaints of some Bosnian merchants about allegedly 
having been taxed illegally by the Ragusans. Like the Ottoman dignitaries in 
the 1640s, Kara Mustafa also showed no interest in the Ragusan argumenta-
tion which tried to present the irreconcilability of the demand with the sultan’s 
charters granted to the city state. Some of the Republic’s diplomats were kept in 
house arrest or even incarcerated, which oﬀers another parallel to the Transy-
lvanian case, and the fate of István Szalánczi.37 Nevertheless, Ragusa did not 
give in and refused to pay the demanded “reparation”. György Rákóczi II’s deci-
sion to accept the higher tribute must have been motivated by his problems 
with the principality’s estates who managed to capitalise on the uncertainty of 
their prince’s rule. From the contemporary correspondence, it is clear that the 
Transylvanian elite was not convinced by the Ottoman arguments and conti-
nued to believe in their own justice, only decided – in the words of the prince’s 
younger brother – that although “we should not give money to the Sublime 
Porte all too easily, but if there is no other way, we could come out of this with 
less now than later.”38
Zdenko Zlatar, writing about the Ragusan crisis a!er the Great Earthquake, 
attributes the aggressive Ottoman position speciﬁcally to the person of Kara 
Mustafa, a dignitary of the Sublime Porte much despised by contemporary 
European diplomats.39 However, the fact that a series of successive grand vizi-
ers used practically the same strategy towards the principality’s diplomats in the 
Transylvanian case points rather towards an interpretation on the system level. 
In the latter case it is even relatively easy to identify the motivation behind the 
37 Zdenko Zlatar, Between the Double Eage and the Crescent: !e Republic of Dubrovnik and 
the Origins of the Eastern Question, Boulder 1992, 104–127; Vesna Miović, Dubrovačka 
diplomacija u Istambulu [Ragusan Diplomacy in Istanbul], Zagreb and Dubrovnik 2003, 
141–167.
38 Zsigmond Rákóczi’s letter to Zsuzsanna Lorántﬀy (Daróc, 13 June 1650) MOL E 190 Nr. 
5817.
39 Zlatar, Between the Double Eagle and the Crescent
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stubbornness shown by the Ottoman administration in the question of secu-
ring a higher income for the Treasury: the War of Candia with Venice, started 
in 1645, turned out to be a much longer military conﬂict than initially expec-
ted and caused enormous ﬁnancial problems for the Empire.40 In light of this 
it is quite understandable that the extra income expected from the prince of 
Transylvania was unlikely to be renounced. A!er a while, it also became a ques-
tion of prestige that the Ottoman side would not allow their tributaries to resist. 
In the case of Ragusa, which took place parallel to the last Ottoman eﬀorts to 
conquer the fortress of Candia and to end the war with Venice, we can legiti-
mately suppose similar background motivations. Both examples demonstrate 
that it is helpful to understand the occasional arbitrary conduct of the Otto-
man state administration in the context of the ﬁnancial problems of maintai-
ning early modern empires. 
40 Ekkehard Eickhoﬀ, Venedig, Wien und die Osmanen: Umbruch in Südosteuropa 1645–
1700, München 1970, 27–57; Kenneth Setton, Venice, Austria and the Turks in the 
Seventeenth Century, Philadelphia 1991, 104–171.
